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Abstract 
Insider trading is a widely discussed subject, relevant for the markets as well as for the 
regulators, since the informational asymmetries diminish the confidence of outsiders on 
market fairness and efficiency and may indicate need for further legislation. 
Several studies concluded that insiders achieve abnormal returns. In Portugal, 
Gonçalves and Duque (2008) confirmed this hypothesis, for a period prior to the 2006 
law enforcements on insider trading. More recently, Corrêa (2012) evidenced that 
insiders continue to obtain abnormal returns.  
The present study tests the insider trading in NYSE Euronext Lisbon, between January 
2008 and December 2013, using the transactions disclosed on CMVM and applying 
portfolio evaluation measurement and attribution methodologies, as well as the 
traditional event studies. It is relevant to note that the performance measurement and 
attribution embody an innovation in terms of the analysis of insiders’ performance, as 
these were not applied in previous studies regarding insider trading in Portugal.  
The empirical findings support that insiders outperform the market, achieving abnormal 
profits and that the greatest market reaction occurs for sales (for an event window of 
[+1,+20], the purchases exhibit a cumulative abnormal return of 1.16% whilst sales 
register -2.13%). The portfolio of insider transactions suffered losses of about 39%, 
against the 65% registered by PSI All-Shares index. Furthermore, the market reaction is 
still significant after the disclosure date, enabling outsiders to profit by mimicking 
insider trades and transactions with earlier disclosures are followed by greater market 
reactions. Additionally, indirect trades (conducted by persons related to the insiders) do 
not appear to include more information than direct transactions and bank directors do 
not possess superior capabilities to forecast returns. Finally, the results show that the 
performance of insiders is mainly attributable to their allocation decisions.   
 
Key-words: Insider Trading; Abnormal Return; Private Information; Portfolio; 
Performance Measurement; Performance Attribution. 
JEL-Codes: G11, G14, G18 
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1. Introduction 
A simple definition for insider trading is the transaction of company’s shares conducted 
by individuals who have business relationships with that company. Insiders can trade 
for several purposes. Sometimes insiders trade involuntarily, for example, when they 
receive stock options to compensate their work in a firm and, if they do not want to 
increase their exposure relative to the company, they will exercise the option, acquiring 
the shares, and immediately selling them. Other occasions, insiders trade voluntarily, 
but whilst some of these trades are legal, others are based on private information, 
conferring them an advantage over the rest of the market.   
But what confers them such an advantage? Well, it is easily understood that those who 
work in a given company, especially the executives and directors, have more 
information regarding that company than the rest of the market does, since they know 
what happens inside the company at each moment. Therefore, they have superior 
information, leading to the existence of informational asymmetries in the stock market, 
as they possess superior capability of predicting future stock price movements of their 
companies. If they decide to use inside information to trade, insiders will achieve 
abnormal profits while outsiders will suffer abnormal losses.   
In Portugal, as in several other countries, insider trading based on private information is 
illegal. However, Gonçalves and Duque (2008) and Corrêa (2012) concluded that, in 
spite of the existing legislation, insiders can still achieve abnormal profits.  
Since 2008, insider transactions are disclosed on the CMVM website. As a result, 
outsiders know insiders’ trades sooner, instead of having to wait, for example, for 
corporate annual reports. Even though Corrêa (2012) used this database in his study, the 
event studies conducted cannot be linearly compared to Gonçalves and Duque (2008) as 
the event windows are distinct. Moreover, Corrêa (2012) did not conduct event studies 
across sectors. Additionally, the exclusion of transactions reduced the sample to only 33 
companies of the 53 included on the PSI All-Shares index at that time. Furthermore, the 
relevance of a new study on this subject is justified by the characteristics of the new 
database, which enable a creation of a portfolio of insider transactions and subsequent 
application of performance measurement and attribution methodologies.  
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The present study tests insider trading, using event study, performance measurement 
and performance attribution methodologies, its patterns on the Portuguese stock market 
and, as a consequence, concludes on whether there is need for further regulation. 
Subsequently, the motivation is to test the strong form efficiency since, if insiders 
achieve abnormal profits, the market is not efficient in the strong form. Accordingly, the 
study aims to answer to the following questions: Does insider trading continue to exist 
in Portugal? What are the relevant patterns? Can outsiders profit by copying the insider 
transactions? Are the results obtained with performance measurement methodologies 
contrary to the ones attained with event studies? and, Is there need for further legislation 
on insider trading? 
This study contributes to the state of the art through the use of portfolio performance 
measures to assess the profits earned by insiders, whilst most authors that study insider 
trading only apply event study methodologies. In fact, performance measurement and 
attribution methodologies were never used to test insider trading in Portugal.  
Throughout this study it must be kept present that the period in analysis includes the 
financial crisis. In effect, the Portuguese market indexes suffered losses in that period 
and, as a consequence, even if the profits earned by insiders are small, they still exceed 
the market average. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explains the concept of 
insider trading, its potential adverse impacts, some worldwide studies on the effects of 
the introduction and enforcement of the insider trading laws and the legislation in 
Portugal. Following, chapter 3 presents the literature review and chapter 4 describes the 
methodological considerations of the study, that is, the methodologies used. Chapter 5 
illustrates the collection of data and the sample creation. Subsequently, chapter 6 
exhibits the results attained with event studies, as well as the creation of a portfolio of 
insider transactions and the findings with performance measurement and attribution 
methodologies. Finally, chapter 7 concludes.  
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2. Concept and Legislation 
This chapter presents the concept of insider trading, as well as the importance of 
legislation on this subject and the current legislation in Portugal.    
2.1. Concept 
It is important to distinguish legal from illegal insider trading. Legal insider trading 
refers to transactions made by insiders, based on public information. In fact, this form of 
insider trading must be allowed as it is a form of compensation for executives. As said 
by Friederich et al. (2002, p. 8), “there is nothing illegal about an insider taking a view 
that their company is misvalued by the stock market, and trading on that basis, provided 
that the insider does not trade on short term price changes”. On the other hand, 
according to Singal (2003, p. 135) “illegal insider trading refers to trading by insiders 
on the basis of material and nonpublic information”, that is, on information capable of 
altering stock prices.  
According to CMVM, insider trading refers to the notion that insiders, such as managers 
and directors of publicly traded companies, having access to more information than the 
remaining investors in the market, can trade based on such inside information. 
Moreover, “inside information shall mean information of a precise nature which has not 
been made public relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers, securities or 
other financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on their market” (Portuguese Securities Code (SC), article 378 number 
3). The use of such information can affect the market mechanisms, jeopardize 
operations taking place and even confer non legit advantages to some investors; as a 
consequence, insider trading is illegal when driven by inside information. 
2.2. Importance of Legislation 
Insider trading can be viewed as a creator of market efficiency, as a proof of market 
inefficiency or even as a creator of inefficiency: on one hand, some authors (for instance 
Carlton and Fischel (1983), Huddart et al. (2001) and Inci et al. (2010)) defend that 
insider transactions contribute to the market efficiency by incorporating information on 
security prices; others state that if insiders achieve abnormal profits then the markets are 
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not efficient (at least in the strong form) and the last state that insider trading has a 
negative impact on the efficiency.  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis established by Fama (1970) states the three forms of 
market efficiency: weak, semi-strong and strong form efficiency. Based on their 
analysis on insider trading, both Finnerty (1976) and Del Brio et al. (2002) refuted the 
strong-form efficiency, whilst Baesel and Stein (1979) found evidence against both the 
strong and semi-strong form efficiency.  
Nevertheless, those who defended the existence of limitations to insider trading state 
that its existence jeopardizes the efficiency of stock markets. Du and Wei (2004) 
concluded that countries where insider trading is more common have more volatile 
stock markets; Fishman and Hagerty (1992) revealed that under specific circumstances 
insider trading leads to a decrease in the efficiency of stock markets and this happens 
due to the adverse consequences of insider trading to the competitiveness: outsiders, 
being aware of the existence of insiders in the market, may deter from acquiring 
information and trading, so the distribution of information becomes skewed to a single 
trader, the insider, once he has superior information. Additionally, insider trading 
widens the market bid-ask spread: one outsider cannot know if the other part of the 
trade is an insider nor if he is using private information to guide his transaction; as a 
consequence, outsiders will decrease the price they are willing to purchase at (bid) and 
increase the price for sales (ask), to balance the losses they might suffer from insider 
trading, since when an insider earns abnormal profits, an outsider suffers abnormal 
losses. 
Several countries, aware of the potential damage of insider trading on stock markets, 
created laws to regulate this practice. With it, they attempted to impose rules in order to 
enhance investor’s confidence on the fairness of trading in financial markets 
(Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). Indeed, as documented by Gu and Li (2012) the 
economic significance of insider trading, measured by quantity and profitability of 
trades, is negatively related to firms’ information transparency. Therefore, laws on 
insider trading and even on the requirements of information disclosures by listed 
companies aim at increasing transparency and consequently correcting the market 
asymmetries associated with inside information. 
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Empirical studies on the legislation of insider trading revealed that: the introduction of 
insider trading laws does not affect the cost of equity but the law enforcements reduce it 
significantly (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009); after the 
initial enforcement of restrictions to insider trading, analysts following in a country 
increase, both in terms of intensity of coverage and extent and this increase is stronger 
in emerging markets (Bushman et al., 2005); in countries with more restrictions to 
insider trading the use of equity incentives is greater and so are executives’ total 
compensations, and these incentives increase significantly after the initial enforcement 
of insider trading laws (Denis and Xu, 2013). Moreover, Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) 
stated that the enforcement of insider trading laws enable an improvement of price 
informativeness but this effect is greater in developed countries. In emerging markets, 
especially in those with weak macroeconomic infrastructures, the enforcement of such 
laws decreases the incorporation of information on prices, thus insider trading laws 
must be complemented with other policy measures. Accordingly, in these markets it 
appears that the enforcement of insider trading laws affects the quality of information 
but not its quantity. 
“If inside information is an appropriate form of compensation for certain corporate 
functionaries, some control of disclosure timing may be necessary to assure that the 
device is effective” (Manne, 1966). Indeed, several countries’ insider trading laws 
include an obligation for insiders to disclose their transactions (for example, in the 
United States of America insiders must report to SEC and in Portugal to CMVM). 
These disclosures enhance the visibility of such transaction to the market, acting as an 
incentive for insiders to restrain from trading with inside information. Nonetheless, 
some authors discovered that the disclosures sometimes contain more information than 
just the characteristics of the trade: insiders exploit their monopoly on information by 
camouflaging their trades with noise trades on the disclosures and, as a consequence, 
information held by insiders is incorporated gradually and at a constant rate on prices 
(Kyle, 1985). Additionally, Huddart et al. (2001) found evidence that the disclosure 
enables a faster incorporation of information on stock prices and reduces insiders’ 
expected profits but there is a dissimulation of insider trades, that is, insiders include 
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noise trades on their disclosures in order to maximize their expected profits, by hiding 
their informational advantage from the rest of the market. 
2.3. Legislation in Portugal 
The Portuguese law prohibits the use and transmission of privileged information before 
it is made public, with the objective of granting similar conditions of access to the 
information by distinct investors, having as reference the moment in which the 
information is announced to the public. In addition, all individuals who have access to 
private information are prohibited to broadcast it, use it to make transactions or to give 
advices on transactions (SC, article 378 number 5) and whoever trades based on 
privileged information should “be punished by a maximum imprisonment of five years 
or a fine”, give back the profits and may be temporarily prohibited from exercising his 
profession (SC, articles 380, 380-A and 378 number 1). 
Additionally, as previously mentioned, CMVM obliges companies to disclose the 
insider transactions: “Persons discharging managerial responsibilities within an issuer of 
securities admitted to trading on regulated markets or a company controlling such 
issuer, as well as any persons closely associated with them, shall notify the CMVM, 
within five working days, of any transactions made for their own account, for the 
account of third parties or by third parties for their account in respect of the shares of 
the relevant issuer or financial instruments related thereto” (SC, article 248-B number 
1).  
Furthermore, since 2006 the issuers must also disclose a list of insiders, that is, 
executives, their family, companies they hold and other persons that perform services 
with the company that have access to inside information. 
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3. Literature Review 
The present chapter illustrates the relevant literature on insider trading, using both event 
studies and alternative methodologies. 
3.1. Relevant Studies 
There is a wide literature on insider trading, largely focused on the informational 
content of insider trades and on the abnormal returns that occur in the market after those 
trades, hence testing the strong form efficiency. Such interest arises from two 
perspectives: on one hand, it enables to test the abnormal profits earned by insiders 
when there is not sufficient information to replicate their portfolios and achieve their 
real profitability; on the other hand, the persistence of abnormal profits over time allows 
to assess whether outsiders could profit from mimicking insiders’ transactions.  
Insiders will achieve abnormal profits if stock prices increase (decrease) after they 
purchase (sell) shares of their companies. Outsiders will profit when copying insiders if 
the abnormal profits earned by insiders persist after the disclosure of insider trades – 
this should not last long since, with the disclosure, the information becomes publicly 
known and should no longer generate profits as it is included in prices.  
Several authors, applied event studies and concluded that insider trading generates 
abnormal returns. Jaffe (1974) realized that insiders possess and exploit special 
information, but large transactions do not appear to contain more information than 
smaller transactions and insiders’ profits do not increase with the intensity of trading. 
Finnerty (1976) also found that insiders can and do indentify profitable as well as 
unprofitable situations within their corporations. Baesel and Stein (1979) stated that 
bank directors achieve higher returns in purchases than ordinary insiders, which they 
believed was due to the first also possessing the information ordinary investors hold. 
Del Brio et al. (2002) agreed that insiders achieve abnormal returns (especially on 
sales); they also compared direct and indirect transactions (that is, transactions made by 
insiders and transactions made by family or companies they own) and with this variable 
they evaluated the effects of the transparency of insider transactions, concluding that 
when there are indirect transactions the abnormal returns are detected later than in 
higher transparency transactions. Friederich et al. (2002) analyzed trades conducted by 
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corporate directors and found evidence of short-term market timing, being able to 
forecast short-term returns. Moreover, the authors realized that medium-size trades 
contain more information than large-size trades for short-term returns, and purchases 
achieve more statistically significant abnormal returns than sales. Cheuk et al. (2006) 
exposed that small firms generate the greater and most persistent abnormal profits 
linked to insider trading, which can persist up to 20 days after the transaction. Fidrmuc 
et al. (2006) studied directors’ transactions and concluded on subsequent significant 
market reactions, especially for purchases, concluding that insiders’ transactions contain 
superior information. Betzer and Theissen (2010) defended that insiders achieve 
positive abnormal returns and found that the impact of the disclosure speed on the 
abnormal returns posterior to the disclosure date was not a significant factor, since such 
returns do not decrease for later disclosures and, subsequently, there is a negative effect 
on the incorporation of information in prices when disclosures occur later. Degryse et 
al. (2014) concluded that insider trades are information driven and insiders achieve 
abnormal returns, especially purchases made by top executives and small capitalization 
firms. Moreover, the authors found evidence of a reduction in the information content 
on sales by top executives after the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive in 
2005. 
On the other hand, Aktas et al. (2008) defended that insiders do not achieve high 
abnormal returns. 
In Portugal the study by Gonçalves and Duque (2008) found that in spite of the 
Portuguese legislation, insiders achieve abnormal profits, especially on purchases. 
Moreover, the abnormal returns are more evident for purchases of companies in the 
communications sector, with small or medium market capitalization, small Price Book 
Value (PBV) and Price Earnings Ratio (PER) and high relative trading volume; for sales 
there is an overall absence of significant negative excess returns, but there are patterns: 
the issuer is a consumer or industrial company, the firm has large market capitalization, 
the relative trading volume of the sales is low and the PBV and PER are high.  
More recently, Corrêa (2012) used the information regarding insider transactions 
published in CMVM, for the period ranging from October 2008 to February 2012 and, 
through the application of the event study methodology the author found evidence that 
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insiders possess timing abilities as, in accordance with Gonçalves and Duque (2008), 
insiders’ purchases (sales) are followed by positive (negative) abnormal returns. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the results obtained by Gonçalves and Duque (2008), Corrêa 
(2012) evidences that the absolute market reaction is greater for sales than for 
purchases. Furthermore, the abnormal returns are greater in the days following the 
disclosure of the transaction, in comparison with the ones subsequent to the transaction 
day, and the market reaction is greater for earlier disclosures. In addition, larger insider 
holdings are related with higher cumulative abnormal returns, volume is only positively 
associated to subsequent positive abnormal returns after large volume transactions are 
excluded and the purchases from small firms generate positive market reactions if the 
transactions with delayed disclosures are excluded. 
The empirical results attained by the previously mentioned authors are summarized in 
table 1, which evidences, in accordance with Gonçalves and Duque (2008, p. 4), that 
“There is a common pattern in the literature: insiders’ purchases (sales) are typically 
preceded by negative (positive) abnormal returns before the transaction date and for the 
event day as well. After the event takes place, the purchases are followed by positive 
returns while after the sales share prices usually decrease”. 
Moreover, it is relevant to note that, even though the results exhibited on table 1 
consider different samples, periods and stock exchanges, they are coherent on the 
argument that insiders are capable of predicting stock price movements and, 
consequently, their transactions outperform the market. 
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Table 1 - Summary of event study results 
 
On the profitability that outsiders can achieve by imitating insider transactions, Cheuk 
et al. (2006) defended that outsiders could achieve abnormal returns, especially when 
Aggregated Purchases Sales
[-15,0] -2.00% - -
[0,+1] 0.60% - -
[0,+2] 1.18% - -
[0,+8] 1.36% - -
[0,+15] 0.50% - -
[0,+1] - 1.01% -0.45%
[0,+2] - 0.85% -0.43%
[0,+3] - 0.37% -0.42%
[0,+6] - 0.49% -0.31%
[0,+11] - 0.20% -0.26%
 (OI) 580 [0,+12] 3.80% - -
 (BD) 405 [0,+12] 7.80% - -
[-100,0] -2.10% -1.40% 2.50%
[-20,0] -1.30% -0.70% 1.70%
[+1,+20] 1.00% 1.10% -0.90%
[+1,+50] 1.60% 1.90% -1.50%
[+1,+100] 2.30% 3.00% -1.70%
[-19,0] - 6.22% 10.11%
[0,+40] - 10.24% -4.30%
[0,+1] 0.33% 0.13% 0.37%
[+1,+15] -0.03% 0.44% -0.58%
[+15,+32] 0.29% 0.04% 0.50%
[+32,+60] 0.60% 0.38% 1.29%
[+1,+60] 0.80% 0.91% 1.00%
[-10,+60] 0.97% -0.09% 3.04%
[+50,+52] -0.94% 4.53%
[-20,+20] - -0.89% -0.23%
[0,+20] - 1.96% -1.46%
[0,+5] - 2.82% 0.79%
[+5,+21] - 1.54% 0.08%
[+21,+180] - 0.32% -0.11%
[-20,-1] - -2.01% 2.29%
[0,+1] - 1.16% -0.26%
[0,+4] - 1.65% -0.49%
[0,+1] - 0.14% 0.28%
[0,+4] - 0.42% 0.23%
[-5,-1] -0.75% -0.18% 1.74%
[+1,+5] 0.31% 0.35% -0.25%
[+1,+10] 0.40% 0.54% -0.15%
[+1,+20] 0.76% 0.92% -0.50%
[+1,+80] 3.11% 4.25% -1.14%
Betzer and 
Theissen (2010)
2002-04 FSE - 1,977 972 1,005 [0,+20] 3.15% 2.91% 3.37%
[-20,-1] - -0.80% 1.66%
[12,34] - - -2.65%
[20,38] - 1.65% -
[0,50] - 1.42% -2.68%
(TE) 1.244 808 436 [0,+20] - 1.97% -1.16%
(O) 1.683 776 907 [0,+20] - 0.83% -2.04%
This table depicts a summary of the results obtained by the authors referred in the literature review who employed event studies. The first column
shows the authors, followed by the sample period, the exchange, the number of firms and transactions included in the study, the number of purchases
and sales and finally the event window applicable and the corresponding cumulative abnormal returns. Abbreviations: CRSP (Chicago Research in
Security Prices); NYSE (New York Stock Exchange); TSE (Toronto Stock Exchange); VSE (Vancouver Stock Exchange); MSE (Madrid Stock
Exchange); SCM (Spanish Continuous Market); LSE (London Stock Exchange); AMEX (American Stock Exchange); ELI (NYSE Euronext
Lisbon); FSE (Frankfurt Stock Exchange); EA (NYSE Euronext Amesterdam); OI (Ordinary Insiders); BD (Bank Directors); TE (Top Executives);
O (Other Insiders) | Regarding the event windows, Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976) and Baesel and Stein (1979) used monthly data whilst the
remaining authors employed daily data.
1,702 1,2682970196LSE
Heinkel and Kraus 
(1987)
Exchange
No. 
Firms
No. 
Transactions
No. 
Purchases
88 995
Author(s)
Sample 
Period
Fidrmuc et al. 
(2006)
1991-98 LSE
MSE
SCM
1992-96
Del Brio et al. 
(2002)
1969-72 NYSE
TSE
1979-81
Friederich et al. 
(2002)
1986-94
Cumulative Abnormal Return
Jeng et al.  (2003) 1975-96
NYSE
AMEX
NASDAQ
No. 
Sales
Event 
Windows
589 406
9,602 21,487
24,371 34,777
-
466 486
Finnerty (1976) - 31,089
Jaffe (1974) 1962-68 CRSP 200 952
111 - -
Seyhun (1986) 1975-81 CRSP 769 59,148
1968-72
Baesel and Stein 
(1979)
350,174
ELI2001-05
-
2,110 59,244 20,023 39,221
1,052 667 385
5,52310,14015,663
1995-99
NYSE
AMEX
Gonçalves and 
Duque (2008)
VSE 132 1,932 -
28
558,229 208,055
Aktas et al.  (2008)
1,492
738 532 206
Degryse et al. 
(2014)
1491999-08 EA
Corrêa (2012) 2008-12 ELI 33
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following insider sales. However, Jaffe (1974) concluded that outsiders could profit 
with the intensive trades published in the Official Summary, if they knew its content on 
time, Seyhun (1986) stated that such information is only profitable on the day it is 
published and Del Brio et al. (2002) concluded that outsiders could not achieve profits 
by copying insiders. Moreover, Friederich et al. (2002) adjusted the estimation of 
abnormal returns to include transaction costs (spread), through the use of daily bid-ask 
spread in order to assess the profitability for outsiders mimicking insider trades and this 
change in methodology led to the disappearance of abnormal returns. As a consequence, 
they concluded outsiders cannot profit from the referred strategies. 
In Portugal, according to Gonçalves and Duque (2008), outsiders would be able to profit 
from copying insiders if the disclosure of transactions was sooner. It is important to note 
that for the period analyzed by these authors, the information regarding insider 
transactions was achieved, in general, in the annual reports of the companies but 
currently that information is available to the public in CMVM website, being that 
outsiders can obtain such information earlier and, consequently, imitate the insiders’ 
trades earlier. The study conducted by Corrêa (2012), regarding data available in the 
CMVM website, concludes that outsiders may be able to profit by mimicking insider 
transactions at least on the 50-day event window (largest event window considered in 
his study), especially for transactions with earlier disclosures.  
3.2. Alternative Methodologies 
The majority of literature on insider trading focuses on the event study methodology 
which estimates equal-weighted average abnormal returns over a fixed period of time 
following insider trades. Nonetheless, this evaluation is not accurate as the periods of 
time do not correspond to the actual insiders’ holding periods and transaction prices 
and, as a consequence, the abnormal returns estimated in those studies may be biased. In 
fact, the option for that methodology is vastly due to the lack of data regarding the 
details of each insider transaction. Hence, some authors included in their methodology 
alternatives to event studies.  
Heinkel and Kraus (1987) studied insider trading using both event studies and portfolio 
performance measures, but whilst the first methodology indicated the existence of 
abnormal profits, the latter did not support superior insider performance, so they 
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concluded that insiders have some profitable trades but generally they do not 
outperform outsiders. Eckbo and Smith (1998) analyzed insider transactions in the Oslo 
Stock Exchange by constructing a portfolio that tracks all insider movements between 
1985 and 1992; they “documented zero or negative abnormal performance by insiders” 
and found that “the average mutual fund outperforms the insider portfolio”. Leland 
(1992), using a rational expectations model and an endogenous investment level 
realized that the existence of insider trading leads to higher stock prices with greater 
informational content, an increase in the expected real investment and a decrease in the 
liquidity of the markets. Furthermore, the author defends that the greater the sensitivity 
of investment to current price the greater the benefits of insider trading. Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) compared the net purchase ration (NPR), as an indicator of insider 
transactions with the market returns, constructed NPR portfolios and realized that in 
aggregate insiders are contrarian investors, but their predictive abilities on market 
movements are better than on contrarian strategies; even more, the predictive power 
comes from purchases. Tavakoli et al. (2012), applying the same methodology as the 
last authors, found evidence that insiders are capable of predicting future returns, 
specifically in transactions made by directors and senior management and outsiders can 
profit from trading strategies that mimic directors’ transactions. Jeng et al. (2003) 
constructed insiders’ portfolios but due to data limitations they had to use proxy returns 
from the purchases and sales portfolios; nevertheless, they concluded that insiders’ 
purchases create abnormal returns but sales do not earn significant abnormal returns.  
A table presenting a summary of the methodologies employed in the literature can be 
consulted in annex A. 
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4. Methodological Aspects 
This chapter describes the methodologies used in the present study. Insider trading will 
be analyzed with event study, performance measurement and performance attribution 
methodologies. On one hand, the event study method is the most widely used in 
literature even though, as previously stated, it is not the most correct as it does not 
regard real holding periods and transaction prices; nevertheless, it was the method 
employed by Gonçalves and Duque (2008) and in order to enable the comparison of the 
results obtained in this study with their results, the methodology must be consistent. On 
the other hand, as almost all the necessary information to construct insiders’ portfolios 
is available on CMVM, it is important to employ alternative methodologies that reflect 
the transactions more accurately. Additionally, the use of distinct methodologies 
enables a comparison of the results obtained. 
4.1. Event Study 
Assuming that an insider will achieve abnormal returns after purchases (sales) whenever 
the stock prices increase (decrease) abnormally, the test hypothesis is to assess whether 
abnormal returns are significantly different from zero on the event day, as well as on the 
following and preceding days. 
The abnormal returns of company   at time   (    ) are achieved by subtracting the 
expect returns (         ) from the actual log returns (   ).  
                    (4.1) 
In the context of insider trading, the expectations on the returns of a given stock are 
dependent on the information detained about the company – if insiders trade with 
private information,    will include it. In line with the notation by MacKinlay (1997), 
the event date (   ) corresponds to the date of the insider transaction, the event 
window ranges between        and     , the estimation window is from      
and      and the lengths of the estimation and event windows are respectively 
         and         . The event windows used in this study are those 
employed by Gonçalves and Duque (2008): [-5,+5], [-5,-1], [+1,+5], [+1,+10], [+1,+20] 
and [+1,+80]; in addition, the length of the estimation window is 245 trading days. 
 THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADERS IN PORTUGAL 
Joana Isabel Guerra da Fonseca 
Master in Finance | 2014 
 
14 
 
The expected returns will be estimated recurring to the market model (equation (4.2)) 
since the advantages of using multifactor models in event studies are limited 
(MacKinlay, 1997), being that “beyond a simple, one-factor market model, there is no 
evidence that more complicated methodologies convey any benefit” (Brown and 
Warner, 1980, p. 249).  
                  (4.2) 
The market model considers market wide factors and the systematic risk. For a given 
security  ,     and     are the log returns in period   for the security and for the market 
portfolio,     is the disturbance term and    and    are parameters of the model. The 
proxy used for the market portfolio is the PSI All-Shares index (even though it is not 
truly representative of all investable securities, it is an index of NYSE Euronext Lisbon) 
and the disturbance of the market model is a proxy for the abnormal return (  ). 
Considering equation (4.2), equation (4.1) can be rewritten as: 
                   (4.3) 
With the purpose of obtaining overall inferences, the abnormal returns must be 
aggregated across time and securities. For each event period  , given   events, the 
sample aggregated abnormal returns is: 
 
        
 
 
     
 
   
 (4.4) 
The aggregation over the event window yields the cumulative abnormal returns (   ) 
for a given event window, which are obtained by: 
 
                    
    
 
  
    
 (4.5) 
The statistics to test the null hypothesis are: 
 
   
       
               
        (4.6) 
 
   
                
                     
   
        
(4.7) 
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“The characteristics of daily data generally present few difficulties in the context of 
event study methodologies” (Brown and Warner, 1985, p. 25). Still, some problems 
may arise, such as the non-normality of returns and of excess returns, the bias in OLS 
estimates of market model parameters in the presence of asynchronous trading and the 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of daily excess returns. With the exception of the 
last, Brown and Warner (1985) defended that there are no significant improvements 
introduced by the use of other procedures rather than OLS. Relative to autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity, tests must be conducted in order to ensure a correct estimation. 
Another potential problem is clustering, which occurs when the event windows of the 
securities overlap and consequently the covariances between the abnormal returns will 
diverge from zero (MacKinlay, 1997). However, Friederich et al. (2002) argue that 
clustering may not be a relevant limitation when different industries and daily data are 
used, as the likelihood of events being clustered decreases under such circumstances.  
In order to surpass some issues present in event studies, MacKinlay (1997) suggested an 
aggregation of abnormal returns into a portfolio dated using event time; however 
Gonçalves and Duque (2008) followed this procedure for the Portuguese stock market, 
and did not obtain significant differences or improvements on the estimation. 
Accordingly, this study will employ the traditional event study methodologies.   
4.2. Performance Measurement 
The performance measurement methodologies described in the present subchapter will 
be applied to a portfolio of insider transactions, constructed with the information 
available on CMVM. Additionally, that information will enable the creation of other 
portfolios: portfolios of insider purchases, of direct and indirect transactions, of bank 
directors and of ordinary insiders. 
4.2.1. Jensen’s Alpha 
Jensen (1968) developed a model (equation (4.8)) to evaluate the predictive ability of a 
portfolio manager, that is, his ability of forecasting security prices. Considering a 
portfolio containing insider trades, Jensen’s Alpha can be applied to measure its 
performance, as insiders can forecast the evolution of security prices of their companies 
better than the rest of the market if they use private information.  
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Let     be the return of the portfolio on period  ,     the risk-free rate of return on 
period  ,     the return of the market portfolio on period  ,     the random error that is 
serially independent,    represents the systematic risk and    is a constant that 
represents the average incremental rate of return on the portfolio due to insiders’ ability 
to forecast price movements – if insiders are capable of predicting future price 
movements,    will be positive. 
                            (4.8) 
According to Grinblatt and Titman (1989), the traditional Jensen measure leads to an 
upwardly biased estimation of systematic risk for market-timing investment strategies; 
as a consequence, that measure can assign negative performance to market timers.  As 
the active management of a portfolio induces a variation of the systematic risk through 
time, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) surpassed that bias by enabling the variation of 
systematic risk across time (herein referred as GT (1989)):  
                             (4.9) 
Where          and            
 
    (being     the period   portfolio weight on 
stock   and    
         
       
). 
4.2.2. Portfolio Change Measure 
Grinblatt and Titman (1993) proposed a Portfolio Change Measure (herein referenced as 
GT (1993)) without the use of benchmarks: 
 
                        
 
   
 
   
 (4.10) 
Where     is portfolio return of stock   from day   to    ,     and        are, 
respectively, the portfolio weights on stock   at the beginning of the periods   and     
and   is the number of days. Moreover,   is set as 1 in order to assess the daily changes.  
Additionally, this study compares the referred measure with the Event Study Measure 
(ES): 
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 (4.11) 
In the absence of inside information, both measures should converge to zero. 
Nevertheless, as Grinblatt and Titman (1993, p. 51) pointed out, the GT (1993) measure 
“has a statistical advantage that derives from its being the average dollar return (i.e., 
end-of-period value per unit of investment) of a zero-cost portfolio”. 
4.3. Performance Attribution 
With the intent of identifying the source of the returns achieved by insiders, this study 
will apply the method suggested by Brinson et al. (1986, 1991). As a result, the 
performance attribution methodology will consist on a holdings-based attribution. The 
active return (  ) of the portfolio is composed by the active asset allocation (allocation 
effect (  )), security selection (selection effect (  )) and the interaction between those 
effects (interaction effect (  )): 
 
                               
 
   
 (4.12) 
 
                  
 
   
                  
 
   
 
(4.13) 
 
                  
 
   
                 
 
   
 
(4.14) 
 
                         
 
   
 
(4.15) 
Where    is the return of the portfolio,    is the return of the benchmark,     and     
are, correspondingly, the weights of asset class   in the portfolio and on the benchmark 
and     and     are, respectively, the return of asset class   on the portfolio and on the 
benchmark.  
The allocation effect reflects the value from differentiating the assets’ allocation from 
the benchmark, the selection effect expresses gains arising from the selection of 
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securities that outperform the benchmark and the interaction effect, the residual to 
achieve the total active return, is the impact of the allocation decisions when the 
performance of the portfolio diverges from that of the benchmark (Ankrim, 1992; 
Stewart et al., 2011). 
In order to assess the determinants of abnormal profits achieved by insiders, the referred 
effects will be computed considering the individual securities instead of the asset 
classes. As a result, the effects will reflect the fact that an insider has inside information 
on his own company rather than superior information on the asset class or industry 
sector. Moreover, the benchmark to be considered is the PSI All-Shares index. 
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5. Sample  
The data relative to insider transactions for the period in analysis was collected from the 
CMVM website. Such information includes the date of the transaction, amount of 
shares purchased or sold, price of the shares transacted, amount of shares held by the 
insider after the transaction and whether it is an indirect transaction (this is, a 
transaction made by the insiders’ family or companies owned) or a direct one 
(transaction made by the insider).  
Information regarding insider transactions from 50 companies were available on this 
database. From those companies, 4 were excluded from the study since their 
transactions took place in the Spanish stock market.  
After that exclusion, 14.584 transactions remained, from which 4 transactions were 
excluded, as they were disclosed in 2008 but took place in 2006 and 2007, reducing the 
sample to 14.580 transactions. 
Subsequently, all the transactions that were not likely driven by private information 
were excluded from the sample, similarly to Del Brio et al. (2002), Gonçalves and 
Duque (2008) and Corrêa (2012), as it is evidenced in table 2.  
Table 2 - Exclusion of transactions 
 
After such exclusion, the final sample contains 46 companies, with a total of 13.833 
transactions realized in period ranging from January 2008 to December 2013.  
Types of transactions excluded
Number of transactions 
excluded
Remaining number of 
transactions
14,580
Remuneration plans 451 14,129
Capital changes 65 14,064
Transactions of something other than shares 64 14,000
Mergers and acquisitions 52 13,948
Other transactions 39 13,909
IPO, SPO and public offering of sale 37 13,872
Transactions within entities held by the same insider 28 13,844
Donations 11 13,833
This table illustrates the exclusion of transactions that were not likely driven by private information, in order to
attain the final sample to be analyzed. Specifically, the first column details the reasons for exclusion, the second
shows the number of transactions excluded and the third column reveals the remaining number of transactions
in the sample. 
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It is relevant to note that the event study methodology may lead to the exclusion of 
additional transactions in order to conduct the analysis, due to insufficient information 
both on the event and on the estimation windows. Moreover, the aggregation of 
transactions by different insiders in the same company will only be made during the 
event studies. The purpose of aggregating and excluding the transactions only in the 
scope of the event study methodology arises from the desire to also construct a truthful 
portfolio of insider trades from this database. 
Additionally, the remaining information necessary for this study (stock, indexes (PSI20 
and PSI All-Shares) and risk-free asset (30 year German Bonds) prices) were obtained 
from Datastream.  
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6. The Performance of Insider Transactions 
The present chapter reveals the results obtained with event studies, the creation of a 
portfolio of insider transactions and the application and findings of performance 
measurement and attribution methodologies. 
6.1. General Results 
This subchapter depicts the results obtained from the application of the event study 
methodology to the sample. Moreover, the sample was divided into activity sectors in 
order to compare their differences in terms of cumulative abnormal returns obtained. 
Furthermore, the potential profitability for outsiders arising from strategies that mimic 
insider trades was computed. Finally, the divergences in abnormal returns regarding the 
transactions’ disclosure delay are addressed. 
6.1.1. Event Study  
Firstly, the event study methodology was applied to the complete sample, including 
both purchases and sales. Graph 1 illustrates the abnormal return patterns for an event 
window of [-5,+5], with markers representing the level of significance according to the 
   test. 
Graph 1 - Average abnormal returns for the event window [-5,+5] 
 
This graph exposes the abnormal returns of the sample (including both purchases and sales)
over the event window [-5,+5]. The vertical axis reveals the average abnormal returns whilst the
horizontal axis contains the days in the event window. Markers indicate the significance of the
average abnormal returns, as detailed in the subtitle. (N= 2959)
-0.10%
-0.05%
0.00%
0.05%
0.10%
0.15%
0.20%
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l 
r
e
tu
r
n
1% significant 5% significant 10% significant
 THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADERS IN PORTUGAL 
Joana Isabel Guerra da Fonseca 
Master in Finance | 2014 
 
22 
 
Even though the pattern is not as consistent as the one obtained by Gonçalves and 
Duque (2008), considering that the aggregation of purchases and sales was made by 
multiplying the sales by -1, one can still conclude that the abnormal returns on the event 
day and after the event exceed the ones that can be obtained on the previous days. 
Therefore, insiders obtain positive abnormal returns on the event day and on the 
subsequent days. 
Graph 2 represents the average cumulative abnormal returns for purchases and sales. 
The vertical axis indicates the average cumulative abnormal returns, in percentage, 
given the event windows days portrayed in the horizontal axis. In addition, markers 
detail the significance according to the    test. It is relevant to emphasize that both the 
purchases and sales’ curves are normalized to be zero on the transaction day (t=0). With 
respect to this graph, it is important to note that the average cumulative abnormal 
returns around the disclosure dates (day 17 and 13, for purchases and sales, 
respectively) are statistically significant at 5%. 
Graph 2 - Average cumulative abnormal returns across the days in the event window 
 
The vertical axis of this graph represents the average cumulative abnormal returns, given the aggregation
of all the purchase/sale events for each day of the event window, referenced in the horizontal axis. The
purchase and sale curves were normalized so that the average cumulative abnormal return is zero on the
event day (t=0). Markers indicate the significance, as detailed in the subtitle.
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As mentioned before, in order to analyze the abnormal returns for different time 
periods, the methodology was applied to several event windows, considering the overall 
sample, insider purchases and insider sales, as reflected on table 3. 
Table 3 - Cumulative abnormal returns for different event windows and samples 
 
It is important to note that most of the after event results are statistically significant for a 
1% significance level, with the exception of the sales sample, that requires higher 
significance levels. In addition, the pre-event cumulative abnormal returns are only 
statistically significant in the sales sample and for a 10% significance level.   
The empirical findings enable to conclude that, for the overall sample, there are positive 
cumulative abnormal returns on the days after the event, which exceed the ones 
previous to the event. Moreover, insider purchases reveal an increase of abnormal 
returns after the purchase day while sales are preceded by positive abnormal returns and 
followed by abnormal losses. These results are in line with the conclusions reached by 
Gonçalves and Duque (2008) and Corrêa (2012), suggesting that insiders’ transactions 
reveal timing ability.  
In addition, the linear comparison with the results obtained by Gonçalves and Duque 
(2008) evidences that regarding the insider purchases, for the same event window, the 
abnormal returns earned by insiders are greater in the period from 2008 to 2013, in 
comparison with the ones computed by the afore mentioned authors between 2001 and 
2005. Additionally, the market reaction posterior to sales also increased in the years in 
analysis in this study, compared to the findings by Gonçalves and Duque (2008). 
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] 0.11% 0.91 0.05% 0.39 0.39% 1.74 *
[-5,+5] 0.63% 3.89 *** 0.68% 3.76 *** 0.33% 1.01
Event day [0] 0.16% 2.38 *** 0.16% 2.05 ** 0.23% 1.89 *
[+1,+5] 0.35% 3.66 *** 0.46% 4.38 *** -0.30% -1.40
[+1,+10] 0.52% 4.09 *** 0.76% 5.51 *** -0.93% -3.07 ***
[+1,+20] 0.68% 3.93 *** 1.16% 6.05 *** -2.13% -5.66 ***
[+1,+80] 4.05% 11.63 *** 5.02% 13.5 *** -1.83% -1.95 *
This table reveals the average CARs for insider transactions, considering different event windows. The
first column indicates the event window, then the results obtained for the overall sample, for the insider
purchases and sales are detailed, respectively. The markers ***, ** and * represent the statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, correspondingly.
Event window
Overall sample (N=2959) Purchases (N=2530) Sales (N=429)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
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On the market reaction subsequent to the insider transactions, in absolute terms, the 
sales sample exhibits a greater reaction than the purchases samples, similarly to Corrêa 
(2012), with the exception of the event window [+1,+80]. Nevertheless, it is relevant to 
emphasize that the period in analysis is demarked by the financial crisis and, 
consequently, by overall negative returns, as further detailed in the creation of the 
portfolio of insider transactions (subchapter 6.2.1.). As a result, even though the sales 
appear to be followed by greater market reactions than purchases, the conclusion that 
sales may indicate greater inside information content, contrary to the evidenced by 
Gonçalves and Duque (2008), may be biased by the financial crisis.    
Concluding, insider purchases are typically followed by an increase in stock prices 
whilst insider sales are followed by a decrease in stock prices and the abnormal profits 
are more accentuated for insider sales than for insider purchases. Accordingly, in spite 
of the existing legislation on insider trading in Portugal, insiders are capable of 
obtaining abnormal profits, which indicates that this phenomenon, firstly detected in 
Portugal by Gonçalves and Duque (2008) for the years comprised between 2001 and 
2005, continued to exist from 2008 to 2013.  
6.1.2. Differences across Sectors 
In order to assess the divergences across the activity sectors, a characteristics analysis 
was conducted, dividing the transactions by sectors, as illustrated in table 4.  
As evidenced in that table, the telecommunications, consumer goods and industrials 
sectors exhibit statistically significant results for purchases in all event windows 
posterior to the event day, in contrast to Gonçalves and Duque (2008) that only recorded 
such significance for the communications sector. In fact, regarding the former 
enunciated sectors, they show positive cumulative abnormal returns after insider 
purchases. On the other hand, the oil and gas and the basic materials sectors indicate 
that their insiders have return predictive abilities on sales.  
The financial sector does not exhibit statistically significant returns in most event 
windows, even though it reveals a significant positive abnormal return, for purchases, 
given an event window of [+1,+80]. With exception of the referred event window, from 
the attained results one cannot conclude, globally, that bank directors possess more 
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information than ordinary insiders, in contrast with the findings of Baesel and Stein 
(1979). Nevertheless, in contrast with Gonçalves and Duque (2008), they do not exhibit 
the worst cumulative abnormal returns amongst the sectors analyzed.   
Table 4 - Cumulative abnormal returns per sector of activity 
 
Panel A - Oil and Gas
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] -3.58% -1.75 -5.62% -2.10 * 1.00% 0.99
[-5,+5] -4.14% -1.58 -5.12% -1.35 -1.94% -3.18 **
Event day [0] -0.84% -1.55 -1.31% -2.03 * 0.22% 0.25
[+1,+5] 0.34% 0.28 1.89% 1.27 -3.13% -22.46 ***
[+1,+10] -2.46% -1.24 -2.14% -0.76 -3.15% -2.16
[+1,+20] -1.64% -0.69 -0.65% -0.19 -3.87% -4.14 **
[+1,+80] -6.58% -1.99 * -1.86% -0.54 -17.22% -4.02 **
Panel B - Basic Materials
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] -0.07% -0.23 0.57% 1.76 * -2.09% -3.82 ***
[-5,+5] -0.63% -1.43 0.68% 1.49 -4.73% -5.27 ***
Event day [0] -0.03% -0.21 0.20% 1.19 -0.78% -2.05 **
[+1,+5] -0.53% -1.93 * -0.14% -0.49 -1.77% -2.50 **
[+1,+10] -1.10% -3.27 *** -0.26% -0.78 -3.72% -4.69 ***
[+1,+20] -2.47% -4.88 *** -0.48% -1.00 -8.74% -8.95 ***
[+1,+80] -0.53% -0.36 0.55% 0.59 -3.94% -0.73
Panel C - Industrials
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] 0.38% 2.32 ** 0.28% 1.49 0.88% 2.63 ***
[-5,+5] 1.05% 4.39 *** 1.05% 3.85 *** 1.05% 2.25 **
Event day [0] 0.15% 1.49 0.13% 1.10 0.24% 1.61
[+1,+5] 0.50% 3.14 *** 0.63% 3.52 *** -0.13% -0.39
[+1,+10] 0.69% 3.04 *** 0.97% 3.86 *** -0.60% -1.11
[+1,+20] 1.26% 4.20 *** 1.81% 5.33 *** -1.36% -2.36 **
[+1,+80] 5.71% 10.17 *** 7.34% 11.90 *** -2.05% -1.72 *
This table reveals the average CARs for insider transactions divided per sector of activity, considering
different event windows. The panels A to I show the results attained for each sector. The first column
indicates the event window, then the results obtained for the overall sample, for the insider purchases and
sales are detailed, respectively. The markers ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, correspondingly.
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=960) Purchases (N=794) Sales (N=166)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=178) Purchases (N=135) Sales (N=43)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=13) Purchases (N=9) Sales (N=4)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
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Panel D - Consumer Goods
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] -0.31% -0.13 -1.06% -0.45 25.93% 0.60
[-5,+5] 4.39% 1.85 * 3.55% 1.55 33.78% 0.68
Event day [0] 0.77% 0.92 1.31% 1.99 * -18.06% 0.68
[+1,+5] 3.95% 2.82 *** 3.34% 2.57 ** 25.27% 1.31
[+1,+10] 3.76% 2.17 ** 3.00% 1.88 * 30.42% 1.50
[+1,+20] 8.07% 2.11 ** 7.68% 1.96 * 21.91% 0.86
[+1,+80] 8.52% 2.64 ** 8.14% 2.46 ** 21.75% 0.40
Panel E - Consumer Services
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] 0.43% 2.07 ** 0.38% 1.78 * 1.53% 1.65
[-5,+5] 1.05% 3.61 *** 0.97% 3.28 *** 2.78% 1.76 *
Event day [0] 0.31% 2.67 *** 0.29% 2.45 ** 0.64% 1.54
[+1,+5] 0.30% 1.38 0.28% 1.29 0.57% 0.56
[+1,+10] 0.72% 2.68 *** 0.73% 2.62 *** 0.49% 0.61
[+1,+20] 0.66% 1.82 * 0.74% 1.99 ** -1.22% -1.13
[+1,+80] 1.73% 2.35 ** 2.18% 2.87 *** -7.90% -3.31 ***
Panel F - Telecommunications
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] 0.93% 3.01 *** 1.39% 3.34 *** 0.23% 0.53
[-5,+5] 1.69% 3.65 *** 2.84% 4.96 *** -0.07% -0.10
Event day [0] 0.21% 1.32 0.15% 0.97 0.29% 0.91
[+1,+5] 0.51% 1.53 1.26% 2.99 *** -0.62% -1.18
[+1,+10] 1.18% 2.52 ** 2.32% 3.87 *** -0.55% -0.78
[+1,+20] 0.97% 1.62 2.07% 2.65 *** -0.70% -0.77
[+1,+80] 10.42% 5.77 *** 15.14% 5.52 *** 3.28% 2.32 **
Panel G - Utilities
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] -0.12% -0.74 -0.07% -0.39 -0.63% -1.59
[-5,+5] 0.23% 1.05 0.38% 1.64 -1.33% -2.23 **
Event day [0] -0.06% -0.64 -0.07% -0.70 0.06% 0.37
[+1,+5] 0.43% 2.75 *** 0.54% 3.27 *** -0.75% -2.04 *
[+1,+10] 0.65% 3.03 *** 0.93% 4.21 *** -2.23% -3.38 ***
[+1,+20] 1.26% 4.22 *** 1.56% 4.93 *** -1.85% -3.24 ***
[+1,+80] 2.09% 2.89 *** 2.30% 3.02 *** -0.50% -0.25
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=318) Purchases (N=290) Sales (N=28)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=146) Purchases (N=88) Sales (N=58)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=813) Purchases (N=777) Sales (N=36)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=36) Purchases (N=35) Sales (N=1)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
 THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADERS IN PORTUGAL 
Joana Isabel Guerra da Fonseca 
Master in Finance | 2014 
 
27 
 
 
6.1.3. Profitability for Outsiders 
Another relevant question is whether outsiders can earn abnormal profits with trading 
strategies that imitate insider trades. The information available on CMVM indicates 
that, on average, the disclosures are released in less than 21 days after the transaction 
date. Taking in consideration the average disclosure period and the abnormal profits 
exhibited on table 3 relative to the event window [+1,+80] (which exceed the abnormal 
returns that can be obtained in smaller event windows), the outsiders can profit from 
strategies that follow insider transactions.  
However, in order to enable a more accurate analysis on the profitability of the 
outsiders, an event study analysis was executed using the disclosure date instead of the 
transaction date. This enables the study of the cumulative abnormal returns that occur 
after the public disclosure of the information regarding the insiders’ transactions and, 
subsequently, compute the abnormal returns that outsiders can obtain by imitating 
insider transactions on the day the disclosure is made. In addition, the comparison of the 
outcomes from this study with the ones previously mentioned concerning the 
transaction date emphasizes the market reactions and profitability after the disclosure.    
Panel H - Financials
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] -1.66% -2.57 ** -2.39% -2.79 *** 0.39% 0.67
[-5,+5] -1.81% -2.09 ** -2.95% -2.63 *** 1.15% 1.42
Event day [0] -0.05% -0.13 -0.46% -0.86 0.79% 2.40 **
[+1,+5] -0.10% -0.33 -0.10% -0.27 -0.03% -0.07
[+1,+10] -0.37% -0.89 -0.20% -0.39 -0.78% -1.17
[+1,+20] -0.18% -0.33 0.40% 0.62 -1.80% -1.70 *
[+1,+80] 7.15% 6.11 *** 9.69% 7.61 *** 0.41% 0.17
Panel I - Technology
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] 0.48% 0.95 0.50% 0.93 0.16% 0.17
[-5,+5] 1.55% 2.03 ** 1.62% 2.03 ** 0.16% 0.14
Event day [0] 0.55% 1.91 * 0.58% 1.90 * 0.03% 0.11
[+1,+5] 0.48% 1.13 0.51% 1.14 -0.05% -0.09
[+1,+10] 0.53% 1.01 0.60% 1.11 -0.93% -1.24
[+1,+20] -0.13% -0.18 -0.03% -0.04 -2.09% -1.33
[+1,+80] 2.79% 2.31 ** 3.54% 2.86 *** -11.50% -4.29 ***
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=179) Purchases (N=170) Sales (N=9)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
Event 
window
Overall sample (N=316) Purchases (N=232) Sales (N=84)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
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As illustrated in table 5, the purchases (sales) are followed by positive (negative) 
cumulative abnormal returns. Consequently, in accordance with the findings of Corrêa 
(2012), an outsider can profit from a strategy of imitating insider transactions.  
Furthermore, the market reaction is greater, in absolute terms, 20 days after the 
disclosure (table 5) in comparison with the market reaction after the transaction date 
(table 3). In addition, similarly to the analysis of market reactions around the transaction 
day, the sales have more significant absolute cumulative abnormal returns, suggesting a 
greater content of information.  
Table 5 - Cumulative abnormal returns around the disclosure day 
 
6.1.4. Disclosure Speed 
As previously referred, the Portuguese law states that insiders must disclose the 
transactions within 5 working days to CMVM. However, the sample in analysis shows 
that disclosures, on average, are made more than 15 working days after the transaction 
day (16.82 days for purchases and 13 days for sales). This divergence from the legal 
reporting period rises the question whether insider trades disclosed within 5 working 
days contain more or less information than transactions which disclosure occurs after 5 
working days. Corrêa (2012) analyzed this subject and found evidence, regarding the 
sample of insider purchases, that the sooner the disclosure, the greater the cumulative 
abnormal returns for an event window of [0,+10], whilst for sales sample there were not 
significant deviations. 
In order to provide a linear comparison between the abnormal returns achieved by 
transactions disclosed within 5 working days and the remaining transactions, event 
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] 0.24% 1.10 0.17% 0.64 0.54% 1.61
[-5,+5] 0.30% 1.05 0.50% 1.49 -0.49% -0.94
Event day [0] -0.04% -0.45 -0.06% -0.71 0.05% 0.33
[+1,+5] 0.07% 0.42 0.37% 1.97 ** -1.09% -2.74 ***
[+1,+10] 0.26% 1.16 0.69% 2.76 *** -1.41% -3.07 ***
[+1,+20] 0.53% 1.64 * 1.31% 3.53 *** -2.50% -4.13 ***
This table reveals the average CARs for insider transactions, considering the disclosure day as the event day,
for different event windows. The first column indicates the event window, then the results obtained for the
overall sample, for the insider purchases and sales are detailed, respectively. The markers ***, ** and *
represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, correspondingly.
Event window
Overall sample (N=931) Purchases (N=741) Sales (N=190)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
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studies were conducted regarding this division. As shown in table 6, the differences 
between the cumulative abnormal returns on panel A and B widen the conclusions made 
by Corrêa (2012) regarding the purchases sample to all samples: insiders’ transactions 
with earlier disclosures are followed by greater market impacts. Nonetheless, the 
subsequent market impact can be attributable either to trades with more significant 
informational content or to outsiders trading in the same direction seeking to profit, as 
they may attribute more importance to these disclosures.  
Table 6 - Cumulative abnormal returns depending on the disclosure speed 
 
6.2. Performance Measurement Results 
As previously noted, event studies do not take into account the real holding periods. 
Consequently, the creation of a portfolio of insider transactions and the use of 
performance measurement methodologies enable a more accurate test on whether 
insiders achieve abnormal profits.  
Panel A - Disclosures exceeding 5 working days
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] 0.16% 1.18 0.09% 0.62 0.62% 1.75 *
[-5,+5] 0.60% 3.00 *** 0.51% 2.38 ** 1.15% 2.18 **
Event day [0] 0.03% 0.26 0.01% 0.07 0.16% 0.99
[+1,+5] 0.40% 3.16 *** 0.41% 2.99 *** 0.34% 0.96
[+1,+10] 0.48% 2.74 *** 0.62% 3.32 *** -0.46% -0.91
[+1,+20] 0.33% 1.39 0.59% 2.32 ** -1.49% -2.61 ***
[+1,+80] 1.46% 3.20 *** 1.82% 3.74 *** -0.94% -0.70
Panel B - Disclosures within 5 working days
CAR CAR CAR
[-5,-1] -0.06% -0.32 -0.09% -0.41 0.12% 0.44
[-5,+5] 0.52% 2.03 ** 0.72% 2.43 ** -0.38% -1.00
Event day [0] 0.30% 4.41 0.32% 4.12 *** 0.34% 1.94 *
[+1,+5] 0.26% 1.86 * 0.48% 2.98 *** -0.86% -3.49 ***
[+1,+10] 0.56% 3.14 *** 0.95% 4.73 *** -1.40% -4.13 ***
[+1,+20] 1.14% 4.40 *** 1.93% 6.71 *** -2.92% -6.01 ***
[+1,+80] 7.04% 13.82 *** 8.92% 16.52 *** -2.67% -2.11 **
This table reveals the average CARs for insider transactions, considering the number of trading days between
the transaction and the disclosure dates. Panel A depicts the results for transactions which disclosures were
made after the legal limit, whilst Panel B shows the results for disclosures within 5 working days. The first
column indicates the event window, then the results obtained for the overall sample, for the insider purchases
and sales are detailed, respectively. The markers ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, correspondingly.
Event window
Overall sample (N=1423) Purchases (N=1191) Sales (N=232)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
Event window
Overall sample (N=1581) Purchases (N=1375) Sales (N=206)
Test θ2 Test θ2 Test θ2
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The present section will depict the creation of a portfolio which aggregates the insider 
transactions in analysis, as well as a direct comparison between the returns attained by 
that portfolio and the returns achieved by the Portuguese market indexes (PSI All-
Shares and PSI20). Subsequently, the results deriving from the application of the 
portfolio measurement methodologies to this portfolio of insider transaction will be   
exhibited.  
Even though that, according to event studies’ results, insider sales have a greater impact 
on the market than insider purchases, which can be attributable to greater information 
content, a portfolio of insider purchases will be created in order to examine the returns 
of a buy and hold strategy, with purchases aligned with the insider acquisitions. 
Finally, in order to assess the differences in terms of returns obtained between direct 
and indirect transactions and bank directors and ordinary insiders, the portfolio is 
divided among these groups and the results from the application of the methodologies 
are detailed.  
6.2.1. Portfolio Creation 
In order to apply performance measurement methodologies, a portfolio of insider 
transactions was created. This portfolio considers the initial amount of transactions held 
by the insiders and the transactions’ outcomes (money earned from sales or spent with 
purchases) were computed with the real prices and amounts of the transactions. 
Additionally, the portfolio is updated daily, thus reflecting the real holding periods of 
the insiders. Moreover, as the portfolio results from the aggregation of the insider 
trades, it includes all the individual information regarding each company.  
Accordingly, this portfolio reflects more accurately the evolution of insider trades in the 
period in analysis and the application of performance measurement methodologies to 
this portfolio can yield more truthful results in comparison with the event study 
methodology since, as previously referred, the latter does not regard real insiders’ 
holding periods or transaction prices (which can bias the conclusions made with the 
estimates of abnormal returns) whilst the former considers real holding periods, 
transaction prices and quantities. 
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Graph 3 illustrates the evolution of the portfolio value throughout the period in analysis, 
considering a base of 100, altering with the daily returns. Such graph enables to 
conclude that the portfolio value had an overall decrease in value between 2008 and 
2013, which is not shocking considering the financial crisis. In addition, a graph 
illustrating the evolution of the returns attained by the portfolio, in percentage, is 
exhibited in annex B. 
Graph 3 - Evolution of the portfolio value (base of 100 at January 2008) 
 
In the period from 2008 to 2013, the portfolio registered an overall return of -39.34%, 
whilst the portfolio of insider purchases achieved and overall return of -14.81%. The 
portfolio of insider purchases was created in the same manner as the portfolio of insider 
transactions, but it ignores the sales made in the period in study. The comparison 
between these portfolios enables to conclude that if insiders had only purchased shares 
and held them until the end of 2013, they would have suffered inferior losses. On the 
other hand, a buy and hold strategy, considering the amount of shares owned in the 
beginning of 2008, would yield a return of -40.15% between 2008 and 2013. As a 
result, the portfolio containing only the insider purchases had the smallest loss 
throughout the period in analysis (of 14.81%), followed by the portfolio of insider 
transactions (the inclusion of insider sales increases the loss to 39.34%), whilst the buy 
This graph depicts the evolution of the value of the portfolios of insider transactions and of insider
purchases, of the buy and hold strategy and of the PSI all-shares and PSI20 indexes, considering a base
of 100 which alters with the daily returns, throughout the period comprised between January 2008 and
December 2013. The vertical axis represents the value of the portfolio with a base of 100 and the
horizontal axis represents the timeline.
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and hold strategy had the worst performance (acquiring the shares in the beginning of 
2008 and holding those positions until the end of 2013 yielded a loss of 40.15%). 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to notice that the period in analysis includes the years of the 
financial crisis, which can potentially bias the study as during such periods the financial 
market reflects unusual behaviors. In fact, for the same period, the returns of the PSI 
All-Shares and of the PSI20 indexes were, respectively, of -65.23% and -68.56%. The 
simple comparison of the returns enables to conclude that the losses suffered by insiders 
were less severe than the ones incurred by the market, that is, the inherent to a passive 
strategy. Table 7 illustrates the mentioned returns obtained by the market indexes, by a 
buy and hold strategy and by the portfolios of insider transactions and of insider 
purchases, between 2008 and 2013. Additionally, a graph of the overall returns detailed 
in table 7 is shown in annex C.  
Table 7 – Market, buy and hold strategy and portfolios' returns between 2008 and 2013 
 
6.2.2. Portfolios of Insider Transactions and of Insider Purchases 
Table 8 reveals the empirical results of the application of the performance measurement 
methodologies to the portfolios of insider transactions and of insider purchases. In Panel 
A the results for Jensen’s Alpha and GT (1989) are detailed. In fact, the alpha is 
positive for both portfolios, indicating that insiders are capable of predicting stock price 
changes. Nevertheless, these results are not statistically significant for the portfolio of 
insider transactions at a significance level of 10%. On the other hand, the results for the 
portfolio of insider purchases exhibit a greater alpha and the results have statistical 
significance at 5%. 
PSI All-Shares 
Index
PSI20 Index
Buy and Hold 
Strategy
Portfolio of Insider 
Transactions
Portfolio of Insider 
Purchases
2008 -71.91% -71.94% -64.13% -62.92% -61.80%
2009 29.90% 28.87% 29.92% 30.14% 30.78%
2010 -10.64% -10.92% -0.70% -4.06% 0.67%
2011 -26.53% -32.29% -21.79% -18.31% -12.87%
2012 2.79% 2.89% 7.18% 9.05% 18.24%
2013 11.17% 14.82% 9.37% 6.76% 10.17%
Overall -65.23% -68.56% -40.15% -39.34% -14.81%
This table details the returns obtained by the Portuguese market indexes, by a buy and hold strategy, by the portfolio of
insider transactions and by the portfolio of insider purchases between 2008 and 2013, as well as the overall returns.
The buy and hold strategy reflects the returns deriving from acquiring the shares in the beginning of 2008 and holding
those positions until the end of 2013, the portfolio of insider transactions contains all transactions in the sample and the
portfolio of insider purchases excludes insider sales.
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Panel B from table 8 details the findings deriving from the application of the GT (1993) 
and ES measures. Such results are expected to converge to zero in the absence of 
superior information. Even though the values do not diverge significantly from zero, for 
both portfolios, they exceed that value, suggesting the existence of privileged 
information. 
Table 8 - Results for Jensen's Alpha, GT (1989), GT (1993) and ES 
 
In summary, the application of Jensen’s Alpha indicates superior information in insider 
trades, even though it is not statistically significant for the portfolio of insider 
transactions. With respect to the GT (1993) measure, the average euro return of a zero 
cost portfolio is of about 0.03% in both cases, which is relevant considering the market 
decline verified in the period in analysis.  It is important to note that this result does not 
diverge from the findings in the event study methodology. 
In accordance with Eckbo and Smith (1998), the results of the portfolio of insider 
transactions exhibited in Panel A are not statistically significant. Moreover, similarly to 
the study conducted by the mentioned authors, the application of the GT (1989) 
methodology (which allows betas to be time-varying) yields smaller estimates of alpha. 
This decrease is also verified in the portfolio of insider purchases.   
Nonetheless, Eckbo and Smith (1998) did not find evidence of abnormal returns using 
performance measurement methodologies, whilst this study does. 
Panel A
Alpha Alpha
Insider transactions 0,012% 0,87 0,009% 0,69
Insider purchases 0,027% 2,16 ** 0,025% 1,98 **
Panel B
Portfolio
Insider transactions
Insider purchases 0,02834%0,02873%
0,02896%
This table exhibits the results attained for the portfolios of insider transactions and of insider
purchases. Panel A shows the outcome from the use of Jensen’s Alpha and GT (1989)
methodologies, while Panel B reveals the values of the GT (1993) and ES measures. The
markers ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,
correspondingly. (N=1566)
GT (1993) ES
0,02858%
Portfolio
Jensen's Alpha GT (1989)
T-statistic T-statistic
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6.2.3. Portfolios of Direct and Indirect Transactions 
As Del Brio et al. (2002) noted, indirect transactions, this is, transactions made by those 
related to the insider are used to conceal the use of privileged information. 
In order to test whether indirect transactions achieve superior returns relative to the 
direct transactions, the portfolio was divided in two: the direct transactions and the 
indirect transactions portfolios. The construction of the portfolio of direct (indirect) 
transactions assumes that only the direct (indirect) transactions take place and that those 
related to the insiders (the insiders) hold their shares throughout the period.  
The application of the performance measure methodologies yields the results exhibited 
in table 9.  
Table 9 - Results for Jensen's Alpha, GT (1989), GT (1993) and ES applied to portfolios of 
direct and indirect transactions 
 
As shown in table 9, all methodologies indicate that in the studied portfolios insiders 
achieve profits. However, whilst the methodologies in Panel A reveal that indirect 
transactions include superior capabilities to forecast price movements in comparison 
with direct transactions, the GT (1993) and ES measures in Panel B yield similar results 
for both portfolios. Moreover, the results in Panel A are not statistically significant, 
similarly to the conclusions made for the portfolio of insider transactions. Therefore, for 
Panel A
Alpha Alpha
Direct transactions 0,009% 0,64 0,007% 0,50
Indirect transactions 0,014% 1,07 0,012% 0,89
Panel B
Portfolio
Direct transactions
Indirect transactions
This table exhibits the results attained for the portfolios of direct and indirect transactions.
Panel A shows the outcome from the use of Jensen’s Alpha and GT (1989) methodologies, 
while Panel B reveals the values of the GT (1993) and ES measures. The markers ***, **
and * represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, correspondingly.
(N=1566)
Portfolio
Jensen's Alpha GT (1989)
T-statistic T-statistic
GT (1993) ES
0,02881% 0,02843%
0,02865% 0,02826%
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the market in analysis and for the period considered, it cannot be concluded that indirect 
transactions include more privileged information than direct transactions. 
6.2.4. Portfolios of Bank Directors and Ordinary Insiders 
Similarly to Baesel and Stein (1979), this study divided the portfolio in order to 
examine separately the returns obtained by bank directors (insiders of financial 
companies) in contrast with ordinary insiders. 
Even though, as concluded by Baesel and Stein (1979), it is expected for bank directors 
to have more information than ordinary insiders and accordingly to obtain higher 
profits, as represented in table 10, both methodologies attribute higher returns to 
ordinary insiders. As a result, bank directors do not appear to have more privileged 
information than the rest of the market. This conclusion is in accordance with the results 
obtained with the application of the event study methodology, in which there are sectors 
that achieve higher and more significant cumulative abnormal returns than the financial 
sector (table 4). 
Table 10 - Results for Jensen's Alpha, GT (1989), GT (1993) and ES applied to portfolios 
of bank directors and ordinary insiders 
 
6.3. Performance Attribution Results 
The performance attribution analysis for the portfolio of insider transactions, evaluated 
on a yearly basis, enabled to conclude that insiders have an overall positive total active 
Panel A
Alpha Alpha
Bank directors -0,039% -0,80 -0,041% -0,82
Ordinary insiders 0,029% 1,78 * 0,024% 1,52
Panel B
Portfolio
Bank directors
Ordinary insiders
GT (1993) ES
0,01814% 0,01764%
0,02634% 0,02602%
This table exhibits the results attained for the portfolios of bank directors and ordinary
insiders. Panel A shows the outcome from the use of Jensen’s Alpha and GT (1989)
methodologies, while Panel B reveals the values of the GT (1993) and ES measures. The
markers ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,
correspondingly. (N=1566)
Portfolio
Jensen's Alpha GT (1989)
T-statistic T-statistic
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return that exceeds 20%. This result supports the conclusions on the previous 
methodologies that insiders outperform the market. Additionally, the allocation effect 
exceeds the selection effect, indicating that the profits are mainly due to the differences 
on allocation choices relative to the benchmark. The outcome of this methodology is 
exhibited on table 11 and the evolution is illustrated in annex D. 
Table 11 - Performance attribution results 
 
In fact, there is a reason for the excess of the allocation effect over the selection effect: 
the period in analysis includes the financial crisis, in which the market exhibited overall 
losses. As a consequence, the creation of value does not arise from selecting securities 
that outperform the market since the portfolio includes most securities that compose the 
market indexes. In effect, the value derives from exploiting moments in which a given 
security yields returns, that is, purchase it before the price increases and selling it prior 
to price declines. These trades will imply a different asset allocation from the 
benchmark for a given time period. Moreover, insiders can make trade decisions that 
result in a more profitable asset allocation because if they possess superior information.  
Subsequently, this methodology corroborates the hypothesis that insiders possess 
privileged information and use it to decide the asset allocation.  
 
  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall
AE 2.23% 0.97% 13.11% 6.29% 9.61% -0.65% 17.81%
SE 1.29% -0.19% 0.69% 7.99% 7.13% -2.11% 8.50%
IE 0.02% 0.69% -3.36% -4.45% -4.96% -0.32% -5.49%
AR 3.53% 1.46% 10.44% 9.83% 11.79% -3.09% 20.82%
This table reveals the findings obtained by the performance attribution analysis of the portfolio
of insider transactions. First, the yearly results are shown, followed by the overall outcome. The 
abbreviation AE, SE, IE and AR denote, respectively, Allocation Effect, Selection Effect,
Interaction Effect and Active Return. 
Performance Attribution
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7. Conclusions 
The present study intended to assess the legal insider trading in Portugal. It is relevant 
to note that this study analyzed a greater database than previous studies in Portugal and 
used, for the first time in Portugal, portfolio management methodologies to study 
insider trading. Through the use of distinct methodologies, including the traditional 
event studies and performance measures of a portfolio that replicates the insider 
transactions in Portugal between 2008 and 2013, the overall conclusion attained 
indicates that insider transactions generate abnormal profits, inducing that they trade 
with inside information. As a consequence, the market does not appear to be efficient in 
the strong form. 
In addition, outsiders can earn abnormal profits if they imitate insider transactions, since 
the time lag between the event and the disclosure is reduced and the abnormal returns 
persist long enough after the disclosure of transactions. As a result, outsiders can profit 
from the informational content of insider transaction disclosures. 
Regarding the differences between activity sectors, the telecommunications, consumer 
goods and industrials sectors exhibit the greatest positive abnormal returns after 
purchases, while the oil and gas and the basic materials sectors reveal the greatest 
market reaction following sales.  
The disclosure speed induces a differential in the cumulative abnormal returns verified, 
since the trades with disclosures within 5 working days from the transaction day have a 
greater market impact, suggesting that they contain more information or that outsiders 
attribute them greater importance than transactions with later disclosures.  
The empirical findings achieved with performance measurement methodologies are less 
significant than the ones obtained with event studies. Nonetheless, they indicate the 
existence of inside information on the basis of insider transactions, being that insiders 
outperform the market.  
Moreover, the division of the portfolio to assess the differences in performance between 
direct and indirect transactions as well as bank directors and ordinary insiders did not 
yield significant differences. Therefore, for the market and period in analysis, the 
indirect transactions do not appear to contain more privileged information than the 
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direct transactions and bank insiders do not have more information than ordinary 
insiders. 
In order to assess the causes of the abnormal returns, a performance attribution analysis 
was conducted. In sum, this methodology enabled to conclude that abnormal profits are, 
in the most part, consequence of the allocation decisions made by insiders. This induces 
that insiders possess private information regarding the company and use it on their 
trades, achieving asset allocations more profitable than the benchmark.  
In spite of the results attained, it must be reckoned that the period in study includes the 
financial crises and that, due to the crisis, financial markets typically exhibit unusual 
behaviors. This reality imposes a limit to the conclusion made, as they may be 
influenced by the crisis. 
Other relevant limitation is the fact that in order to profit from insider transaction, 
outsiders may be require to perform short-selling strategies, which are limited in the 
Portuguese stock market.  
Nevertheless, the empirical findings suggest that insiders earn abnormal profits and, 
subsequently, there is need for further legislation on this subject in Portugal, in order to 
bring the market closer to the strong form efficiency. 
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9. Annexes 
9.1. Annex A – Methodologies used in similar studies 
 
  
Methodology Author(s)
Jaffe (1974)
Finnerty (1976)
Baesel and Stein (1979)
Seyhun (1986)
Heinkel and Kraus (1987)
Eckbo and Smith (1998)
Del Brio et al. (2002) 
Friederich et al.  (2002)
Jeng et al.  (2003)
Fidrmuc et al.  (2006)
Aktas et al.  (2008)
Gonçalves and Duque (2008)
Betzer and Theissen (2010)
Corrêa (2012)
Degryse et al.  (2014)
Expected Rates of Return Heinkel and Kraus (1987)
Grinblatt and Titman (1989) Eckbo and Smith (1998)
Grinblatt and Titman (1993) Eckbo and Smith (1998)
Jensen's Alpha Eckbo and Smith (1998)
Rational Expectations Model Leland (1992)
Lakonishok and Lee (2001)
Tavakoli et al.  (2012)
CAPM Jeng et al.  (2003)
Characteristic-Selectivity Measure Jeng et al.  (2003)
Four-Factor Model Jeng et al.  (2003)
Event Studies
Net Purchase Ratio
This table illustrates the methodologies used by the authors mentioned in
the insider trading literature review. The first column indicates the
methodology and the second presents the authors who applied it.
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9.2. Annex B – Evolution of the returns attained by the portfolio of insider transactions 
 
This graph illustrates the evolution of the returns obtained by the portfolio of insider transactions, between January 2008 and December 2013.
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9.3. Annex C – Market, portfolios of insider transactions and purchases and buy 
and hold strategy returns 
 
9.4. Annex D – Performance attribution evolution 
 
This graph details the returns obtained by the Portuguese market indexes, by a buy and hold
strategy andby the portfolio of insider transactions and by the portfolio of insider purchases
between 2008 and 2013.
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This graph reveals the evolution of the results obtained by the performance attribution analysis
of the portfolio of insider transactions. The abbreviation AE, SE, IE and AR denote,
respectively, Allocation Effect, Selection Effect, Interaction Effect and Active Return. 
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